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This paper presents a case study for motivating the use of data mining in a social agent-based 
simulation framework. The data used in this article come from the social simulation platform 
SocLab. They were generated from a model designed to analyze a real situation related to the 
management of a river in South West of France. Several standard statistics methods are used to 
analyze the possible outcomes of the discussion between the actors. Finally, a typology of these 
outcomes is obtained with self-organizing map.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Agent-based models and the sociology of 
organized action 
Agent-based modeling (ABM) consists in 
describing the behavior of the active entities of a 
system of interest (the “agents”) and how they 
interact within their shared environment. Thus, 
the way the model functions is the consequence of 
the interactions between the agents and of their 
behaviors. As long as  the phenomena observed in 
the system are well reproduced in the outputs of 
the simulation model, the model provides a 
possible realistic explanation for the occurrence of 
these phenomena (AXELROD, 1997). This 
approach is especially fruitful for studying 
complex systems that can not be tackled by 
analytical approaches without a distorting over-
simplification. It is increasingly used for the 
simulation of social systems (see, for example, the 
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social 
Simulation1). 
The present paper describes the analyses of 
simulations produced by an agent-based social 
                                                          
1  http:// jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk  
simulation platform called SocLab2. SocLab has 
been designed for analyzing social organizations, 
or more generally systems of organized action, 
where people regularly interact for a given 
purpose in a given context. SocLab is based on a 
well established sociological theory of 
organizations, the “sociology of organized action” 
(SOA), introduced by (CROZIER 1964) and 
(CROZIER and FRIEDBERG 1977). Roughly 
speaking, SOA analyzes social organizations in 
order to explain why people behave as they do, 
especially when they do not behave as they are 
supposed to, regarding the organization's rules. 
An organization is defined as a set of actors and a 
set of resources. Each actor has some goals, which 
are a mix of his own objectives and his 
organizational roles, and he needs some resources 
to reach these goals. On the other hand, each actor 
controls the access to some resources, and so 
determines to what extent those needing these 
resources have the means to achieve their goals.  
Actors are assumed to be rational, that is to say 
their behavior is driven by their beliefs on the best 
way to achieve their goals. So, each actor manages 
the resources he controls and cooperates with 
others in order to obtain, from them, access to the 
resources he himself needs. The actors are 
reciprocally dependent on each other and we call 
social actor game the process by which they 
mutually adjust their behaviors with respect to 
others.  
Most organizations feature the well-known 
regulation phenomenon: according to it, the 
adjustment process regularizes an organization so 
that its actors are found to exhibit quite steady 
behaviors. The agent-based modeling and 
simulation of an organization are expected to shed 
light about its possible regulations.  
 
The SocLab analysis of organizations 
This section describes more precisely the 
structure of a SocLab model of given organization 
(see (SIBERTIN-BLANC et al. 2013a) for a 
comprehensive presentation of the SocLab 
framework). 
 
Figure 1. Model of organizations according to 
the SocLab platform 
                                                          
2 http://soclabproject.wordpress.com/using-soclab   
 
The first step is made by the sociologist: using 
surveys and fieldwork, the sociologist analyses the 
organization and observes the behavior of the 
actors and how much each one cooperates. Then, 
through an intuitive user interface, the SocLab 
platform allows him to edit his model, which 
describes the structure of the organization. This 
step is highly dependant of expert knowledge and 
is very important to obtain a model that 
represents well the reality. For designing a model 
in SocLab, the following elements have to be 
defined (see also Figure 1): 
 the list of the actors; 
 the list of the resources: each resource is 
controlled (or managed) by an actor. This 
actor behaves in a more or less 
cooperative way and the state of a 
resource measures (on a scale of -10 to 10) 
how much he tends (or does not tend) to 
cooperate with others by favoring (or 
hindering) the access to the resource; 
 the stake of every actor on every resource: 
this quantity measures the importance of a 
given resource for a given actor. The more 
a resource is needed to achieve an actor's 
important goal, the higher the 
corresponding stake (on a scale of zero to 
ten; the sum of the stakes for every actor 
sums to ten); 
 the effect function of every resource on 
every actor having a not null stake on this 
resource: this function quantifies how well 
the actor can use the resource to reach his 
goals, depending on the state of the 
resource; 
 the solidarities of every actor towards 
each of the others. 
A configuration (or state) of the organization is 
defined as the vector of the resource states. Thus, 
a configuration is characterized by the level of 
cooperation of each actor with regard to the 
others. In any configuration of the organization, 
every actor gets from others some capacity to 
mobilize the resources needed to achieve his 
objectives. This satisfaction of an actor a when 
the organization is in a configuration s = (sr)r  R is 
calculated as the sum of the values of the effect 
functions, weighted by the actor’s stake: 
satisfaction(a, s) = r  R stake(a, r) * effectr(a, sr) (1) 
 
SocLab provides some tools for the analytical 
investigation of (the model of) an organization. 
For instance, it computes many indicators about 
structural or state-dependent properties of the 
organization. It also allows the user to 
interactively explore the space of the 
organization’s configurations and to compare the 
resulting satisfactions for the actors, e.g., the 
configurations which optimize or minimize the 
satisfaction of a given actor or the Nash equilibria 
(CHAPRON 2012). 
 
The SocLab platform includes a simulation engine 
which implements the regulation process within 
an organization and so computes which behavior 
each actor is likely to adopt (EL GEMAYEL et al., 
2011). To this end, a multi-agents implementation 
of the model of an organization provides the 
actors with a rationality for playing the social 
actor game. Social actors try, as a meta-goal, to get 
a high level of satisfaction, i.e., to have the means 
needed to achieve their concrete goals. However, 
according to the bounded rationality assumption 
(SIMON, 1955) they just look for a “satisficing” 
level of satisfaction, not an illusory optimal one. 
So, within a trial-error reinforcement learning 
process (SUTTON and BARTO, 1998), each actor 
maintains a dynamic level of aspiration, and a 
simulation terminates when a stationary state is 
reached because every actor has a satisfaction that 
is over his level of aspiration. In such a state, the 
actors' behaviors are such that each one accepts 
his level of satisfaction and the ones of others: the 
organization can work in this way, a regulated 
configuration has been found. The length of a 
simulation, i.e. the number of steps necessary to 
reach a stationary state, indicates how much it is 
difficult for the actors to jointly find how to 
cooperate. Full explanations about this algorithm 
are given in (SIBERTIN-BLANC et al. 2013b) and 
(EL GEMAYEL, 2013). 
This simulation algorithm is partly stochastic, so 
that each simulation constitutes an experiment, 
whose outputs provide values for the state of each 
resource and the satisfaction gained by each actor. 
The designer of the model of an organization 
expects that a number of the simulation 
experiments correspond to the observed state of 
the organization. If this is not the case, the model 
of the organization is to be revised, except if the 
sociologist is able to explain this anomaly by 
peculiar causes. However, the SOA is fully 
compliant with the fact that the simulation 
includes experiments that are quite far from the 
observed state of the real organization: they 
correspond to “potentialities”, possible ways of 
operating of the organization, to configurations 
which have not been observed yet but which might 
be observed in the future. A tight matching 
between all simulation experiments and the 
observed state of the organization will be 
interpreted by the sociologist as a structural 
property of the organization: this results from a 
strongly regulated organization in which the 
actors have a limited freedom to depart from a 
normative behavior. Thus, as long as the model of 
the organization under study is not strongly 
regulated, SocLab should provide a large number 
of experiments which correspond to different 
possible futures. The identification of different 
operating scenarios can give a simplified overview 
of the internal possibilities of the organization and 
it can also help decipher the balance of power and 
the intrinsic structure of the organization. 
 
In the present article, such an approach is 
illustrated on a real-world case study related to 
water management in a French area. Section 2 
describes the case study and the variables 
provided in the companion dataset. Section 3 
describes the statistical analysis of the 
simulations, focusing on statistical methods that 
provide a simplified and visual representation of 
the dataset. In particular, self-organizing maps 
are used to extract the main regulated 
configurations of the organization that may be 
envisioned. The results are commented in regards 
with the underlying sociological context. A 
discussion and a conclusion are finally provided in 
Section 4. 
 
2. The source of data 
 
Context 
This dataset contains the outputs of 100 
simulations generated by the SocLab model of an 
organized action system concerning the 
management of a river called Touch. Touch is a 
tributary of the Garonne in which it flows 
downstream of Toulouse, an agglomeration of one 
million inhabitants in the South West of France. 
Its catchment area covers 60 municipalities and 
its course crosses 29 municipalities. Three fourth 
of these municipalities stand upstream and are 
mainly agricultural villages or small towns. Unlike 
upstream area, the one fourth municipalities 
located downstream form a dense urban area of 
the Toulouse agglomeration. Downstream 
municipalities have had to deal with several 
episodes of flooding during the past decades. They 
consider that upstream municipalities do not 
cooperate enough and they have tried to protect 
themselves by building dikes that, even if 
expensive, are not sufficient to eliminate the 
flooding risk. On the contrary, upstream 
municipalities, strongly influenced by the farmers, 
consider that they have taken responsibility for 
preventing flooding by letting some land lying 
uncultivated, in order to absorb the excess of 
water in case of flooding.  
 
Since 1995, the French water policy requires the 
elaboration of a flood risk prevention plan (FRPP) 
of each river, and this obligation was reinforced by 
the European Water Framework Directive (WFD 
2000/60/EC), transposed into the French law as 
the Law on Water and Aquatic Ecosystems (LEMA, Law 
of 30 December 2006). On the occasion of the 
establishment of the PRPP of the Touch, B. 
BALDET (2012) studied the difficulties to reach a 
agreement that combines the views of all the field 
stakeholders and of administrative authorities. He 
analyses the field observations to the light of 
several sociological theories. The SocLab model, 
whose simulation results are reported in this 
paper, describes the system of organized action 
devoted to the elaboration of the Touch's FRPP 
and has been designed in order to formally 
confirm (or infirm) the empirical findings. We just 
introduce the actors and the resources of the 
system and outline the issues at hand. The 
interested reader will find at the site (SIBERTIN-
BLANC et al. 2013c) a detailed presentation of the 
case, including the empirical and theoretical 
dimensions, the SocLab model itself and the 
dataset of the simulation results. 
 
Actors 
The action system includes 10 actors which are 
involved in the management of the river and 
somehow depend on the FRPP: 
 actor 1: Departmental Territory Direction 
(DDT) acts as the State representative and will 
instruct the new FRPP; 
 actor 2: National Office for Water and 
Aquatic Ecosystem (ONEMA) is the reference 
agency for the monitoring of water and 
aquatic environment; 
 actor 3: Adour-Garonne Water Agency 
(AEAG) is the operational authority in charge 
of strategic plans at the basin level. 
Accounting for the requirements of the 
various water uses and of the protection of 
aquatic ecosystems, it defines, supervises and 
funds the water policy; 
 actor 4 is a citizen organization of riparian 
farmers in the upstream area. They own 
floodplain land and, as they are riparian, they 
have the right to use the river and must 
maintain the banks; 
 actor 5 is the group of 25 upstream 
municipalities that have 21,000 inhabitants; 
 actor 6 is the group of downstream 
municipalities (75,000 inhabitants) that are 
incriminated at each occurrence of a natural 
catastrophe. Due to flooding threats, they 
must prohibit any building on a portion of 
their territory; 
 actor 7 is the inter-communal association for 
water civil engineering (SIAH)3, in charge of 
the management of Touch. Especially, it has to 
maintain the river bed and banks. It includes 
representatives of the 29 riparian 
municipalities and its active manager favors 
the cooperation among municipalities while 
worrying about the Good Ecological Status of 
the river; 
 actors 8 and 9 are political authorities, the 
regional and departmental councils, 
respectively. They can bring additional 
financial support to civil engineering 
measures; 
 actor 10 is an engineering consulting firm, 
specialized in water, energy and environment, 
in charge of technical studies. 
The actors which are the most engaged in the 
negotiation, are actors 6, 4 and 5 from the 
population point of view, and actors 7, 3 and 9 
from the institutional point of view. All these 
actors are strongly concerned by both the 
elaboration and the further implementation of the 
FRPP. Actors 1, 2, 8 and 10 are less concerned. 
 
Resources 
In this model, each actor controls one resource 
that summarizes its means to influence the 
discussion. 
 “Validation” (between -10 and 10) is the more 
or less harsh regard of actor 1 on the 
prevention plan proposed by actor 7. This 
validation is made on the basis of technical 
and ecological criteria; 
 “Expertise” (between -8 and 8) is the outcome 
of a study of which actor 2 is in charge. Actor 2 
can give a positive or a negative appraisal on 
the construction work, based mostly on 
ecological criteria; 
 “Funding” (between -8 and 8) is a funding 
coming from actor 3 which can pay for up to 
                                                          
3  Literally “Syndicat Intercommunal d’Aménagement 
Hydraulique” of Touch, committed by the State to 
maintain the river for the sake of the riparian people. 
Riparian people owns the river until the middle of its bed. 
This association is funded by the Water Agency (actor 3). 
See http://www.siah-du-touch.org. 
75% of the total cost of a construction work if 
the project is considered as ecological; 
 “Lobbying” (between -10 and 10) is an action 
controlled by actor 4 which owns the 
floodplain lands. As this actor is not much 
concerned by ecological issues, it is frequently 
arguing against actors 2 and 3; 
 “Control of flow” (between -8 and 8) is the 
capability of upstream villages (actor 5) to 
keep in their territory a part of the water that 
provokes flooding episodes downstream; 
 “Self funding” (between -8 and 8) is the 
capacity of downstream villages (actor 6) to 
fund the civil engineering works; 
 “River management” (between -8 and 8) is the 
activity of actor 7 in river management: a low 
level means that the association is minimizing 
its involvement in river maintenance and a 
high level means that the association is 
involved in trying to prevent threats coming 
from the river; 
 “Additional funding” (between -7 and 7) is the 
financial involvement of actor 8 in the project; 
 “Additional funding 2” (between -6 and 6) is 
the financial involvement of actor 9 in the 
project: actor 9 has its own bureaucratic rules 
to give a project financial assistance. A high 
level for this resource means harder (mainly 
ecological) constraints to grant the project; 
 “Studies” (between -8 and 8) is a study made 
by actor 10: a positive value means that the 
study suggests a hydromorphological solution 
(i.e., an ecological approach that uses the 
shape of the river for trying to prevent 
flooding) and a negative value means that the 
study suggests a hydraulic solution (dike 
construction, which is less ecological). 
 
The analysis of the debates, notably within the 
SIAH, shows three main options for the Touch 
management, each one supported by some of the 
actors: 
1. (O1) protecting the downstream towns 
against floods, and defending the interests of 
these municipalities (supported by actor 6); 
2. (O2) protecting the daily life of upstream 
villages, and especially protecting agricultural 
activities (supported by actors 4 and 5); 
3. (O3) ensuring a good ecological state of the 
aquatic environment (supported by actors 2 
and 3). 
Upstream and downstream municipalities are 
interdependent, though their respective interests 
are different or even conflicting. So the 
elaboration of the FRPP includes a fourth option 
which is probably the main issue of the 
discussions: 
4. (O4) finding a solution which is a 
compromise acceptable to the population and 
its representatives (sought by actors 7, 3, 1, 8 
and 9 by order of influence, according to their 
respective status). This issue is essential 
because, whatever the chosen solution for the 
Touch management, it will not be effectively 
implemented if it is not agreed by most actors. 
 
3. Statistical analysis 
 
Dataset description  
The dataset contains the outputs of 100 
simulations with, for each one, the number of 
steps, the state of the 10 resources and the 
satisfaction of the actors at the end of the 
simulation. The satisfaction of each actor depends 
on the state of the resources, by a function that 
involves its stakes and the resources' effect 
functions (see Equation (1)). Each actors put 3 or 
4 stake points on the relation it controls so that its 
satisfaction depends about one third on its own 
behavior. The possible range of values of actors' 
satisfactions are quite varying, from 90 (actor 2) 
to 195 (actor 6). Their lower bounds (the worst 
configuration for each of them) are on a scale of –
25 (actor 2) to –85 (actor 6) and their upper 
bounds (the best configuration) on a scale of 60 
(actor 8) to 110 (actor 6). 
 
Univariate Statistical Analysis 
A quick overview of the variable values is provided 
in Figure 2. The number of steps is strongly 
skewed with a small number of simulations 
having a very large number of steps. Most 
resource states (except for “Self funding”, “River 
management” and “Additional funding”) also have 
a skewed distribution, with several outliers having 
small (and even negative for some of them) 
values. The scattering of the state variables is very 
different: some variables have a very small 
dispersion, like “Validation” (which is frequently 
equal to 10, the maximum possible value) or 
“Additional funding 2” which is almost always 
equal to 6 (also its maximum possible value). For 
these resources, as well as for “Lobbying”, 
“Control of flow” and “River management” (but to 
a lesser extent), the organization's constraints are 
such that the possible values for these resources 
seem almost fixed in advance. On the contrary, 
“Expertise”, or even “Self funding” and 
“Additional funding” are resources that have a 
larger dispersion (for “Expertise” the values go 
from –8 to 8): the actors which control these 
resources are less constrained by the organization 
and a deeper analysis is necessary to decide 
whether they hesitate between quite similar 
choices or whether they strategically adapt their 
behavior to the context. 
The satisfactions of most actors are approximately 
symmetric, but with a small variability regarding 
their range (most interquartile ranges are less 
than 3). Red is used to emphasize actors for which 
the median satisfaction is smaller than 50 (actors 
which are thus frequently little satisfied: actors 4, 
6 and 10) whereas blue is used in the other case. 
Actors 3, 8 and 9 are the most satisfied in almost 
all simulations (actor 8 is always the most 
satisfied). As actor 6 has a low satisfaction, the 
option (O1) will probably not prevail. The same 
holds for actors 4 and 5, and thus for the option 
(O2), but to a lesser extent. As the satisfaction of 
actors 2 and 3 is slightly better, the option (O3) 
seems to be the most likely. As the satisfaction of 
actor 7 is medium, it seems that a compromise 
that would be acceptable by most actors is 
possible (O4), and this is compliant with the fact 
that none of the options (O1), (O2) or (O3) 
strongly prevails upon the others.  
The dispersion of the actors' satisfactions shows 
that the position of actors 4, 9, 6 and 3 are well 
settled, while the positions of actors 5 and 7 are 
more uncertain. Considering their respective 
range of values, the actor satisfactions are globally 
more steady (with smaller dispersions) than the 
resource states: the variation coefficients of actor 
satisfactions have a range of 0.02 to 0.06, whereas 
those of resource states have a range of 0.06 to 
0.98 (except for “Additional Funding 2”). This fact 
might be explained by a complex system effect, 
where the actors compensate the lack of 
accessibility to an important resource by accessing 
another one. 
 
 
 
Correlation analysis 
Figure 3 shows a graphical representation of the 
correlation coefficients between all pairs of 
variables. The number of steps has a slight 
negative influence on all actors, except for 
upstream actors 4 and 5. This is a general 
 
Figure 2. Boxplots for the number of steps before the simulations converge (left), the resource states 
(middle) and the actor satisfactions (right). For actors, a blue boxplot indicates that the actor has a 
median satisfaction that is above 50 and a red boxplot indicates that the actor has a median satisfaction 
that is below 50. 
property of the simulation algorithm: long 
simulations indicate that actors struggle to find a 
configuration that provides each of them with an 
acceptable level of satisfaction. This difficulty to 
cooperate entails lower levels of satisfaction. 
The correlations between the actors’ satisfactions 
show two groups of strongly related actors: actors 
1, 2, 3 and 7, on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, actors 8 and 9. Actors 1, 2 and 3 are 
organizations that represent the State and carry 
out public policies. The positive correlation 
between their satisfactions means that their main 
interests are consistent and that these three 
domains of the State policy strengthen one 
another. Moreover, actor 7, instituted by actor 1 
and funded by actor 3, is shown to be in 
accordance with the State services. Actors 8 and 9 
are political institutions and it is not surprising 
that they have similar interests on topics such as 
the river management. Moreover, the correlation 
between the two groups is positive: there is no 
conflict between the State and the local 
authorities. 
As for actors 4, 5 and 6, they are highly concerned 
with the river functioning. They have to be 
regarded in conjunction with actor 7, which is the 
place where they can build a compromise 
together. Actor 5 seems careful; surprisingly, it 
does not support the farmer association nor is it in 
conflict with downstream municipalities. The case 
of actor 4 requires a specific attention: it is in 
conflict with actors 6 and 7, and also with most of 
the other actors. However we will see that it is not 
powerful enough to prevent a decision to be made 
(this is because the effect functions of the relation 
it controls have a small amplitude). The 
satisfaction of actor 7 is positively correlated with 
those of actors 5 and 6, and also actors 2 and 3: 
these actors support the options (O1), (O2) or 
(O3). This fact confirms the possibility of a 
compromise (O4), which has already been 
pointed out in the analysis of the actor 
satisfactions. 
 
 
Some resource states are strongly correlated to 
actor satisfactions: “Expertise” is strongly 
correlated with the satisfaction of actor 1, which is 
explained because actor 1 is strongly concerned 
with ecological issues. Ecological issues are indeed 
the main criteria for the level of this resource. 
“Funding” is strongly correlated to the satisfaction 
of actors 8 and 9 because a higher financial 
engagement from actor 3 means a lesser need for 
their financial effort; moreover, actor 3 bases its 
degree of implication on ecological issues and so, 
his concern meets those of actors 8 and 9. 
“Control of flow” is the most influential resource 
on all actors' satisfactions, while its values are 
small dispersed (see figure 1): it is strongly 
positively correlated with the satisfaction of actor 
4 and it is strongly negatively correlated with the 
satisfaction of the other actors (except for actor 5): 
a low level of this resource means a stronger 
control on river and thus a higher decision power 
for actors 2, 3, 6 and 7. Finally, “Self funding” is 
strongly negatively correlated with the satisfaction 
of actors 5 and 7: a high level for this resource 
means a higher decision power for actor 6 which 
Figure 3. Graphical representation of the correlation coefficients between pairs of 
variables: the thinner the ellipse, the larger the absolute value of the correlation coefficient 
(as described in MURDOCH and CHOW, 1996 and implemented in the R package ellipse). 
Red ellipses indicate positive correlations whereas blue ones indicate negative correlations, 
the intensity of the color also matches the absolute value of the correlation coefficient 
(darker colors are used for larger values). 
reduces the decision power of actors 5 and 7. 
These results show that the behavior of the model 
is strongly non-linear: contrary to the very 
structure of the model, the satisfaction of most 
actors is not strongly correlated to the resource 
that it controls. The actor might somehow 
compensate for an unsatisfactory level of its own 
resource by a better level of the other resources. 
The complete explanation of this phenomenon 
would require further investigations. 
There is no remarkable correlation between any 
pair of relations: the actors' behaviors are 
independent of one another. There is no 
coordination or coalition within a subgroup of 
actors, no actor seems to strongly influence the 
behavior of another one and, in other words, each 
actor is autonomous with regard to others. 
 
Hierarchical clustering 
 
To be able to understand multiple complex 
correlations between the actor satisfactions and 
behaviors, pairwise correlations studies are not 
enough. Multiple correlations can be understood 
by a number of methods, such as PCA, MDS, 
clustering... In the present section a hierarchical 
clustering is performed and analyzed. Figure 4 is 
the resulting dendrogram, where four clusters of 
simulations are identified. A first observation is 
that one simulation is clearly an outlier, the 
simulation number 16 (at the right hand side of 
the dendrogram). 
Figures 5 and 6 display an overview of each 
cluster: the boxplots of the number of steps, of the 
resource states and of the actor satisfactions for 
each cluster. They allow us to compare the relative 
positions of the actors and resources within every 
cluster. In addition, Figures 7 and 8 display the 
component point of view: each actor's 
satisfactions and each resource's states are 
displayed by cluster, in order to make the 
comparison between clusters easier to read. The 
first fact worth noting is that all four clusters are 
very similar in the way the satisfactions of the 
different actors are ranked: actors 3, 8 and 9 are 
always the most satisfied and actors 4, 6 and 10 
are always the less satisfied. Besides, comparing 
the clusters, differences can be emphasized. 
The most singular cluster is cluster number 2 
(containing 7 simulations, in orange): the 
simulations of cluster 2 are characterized by a 
higher satisfaction for all actors (especially for 
actor 6), except for actor 4 (comparatively to the 
other clusters). This fact is consistent with the 
small number of steps. Also, notice that the 
satisfaction of actors 5 and 7 is highly varying, 
which indicates an unsure position for these 
actors. On the resource point of view, the cluster is 
characterized by lower states for the resource 
“Lobbying” (controlled by actor 4) and also for the 
“Control of flow”. Another prominent fact of this 
cluster is that actor 7 is ranked over the others 
(except for actors 3, 8 and 9 which are at the top 
in all cases); these facts indicate that these 
simulations comply with option (O4). Cluster 2 
corresponds to reaching the best compromise in 
the process of elaborating the new public policy of 
Touch. Unfortunately  it is not the most likely 
outcome, since the cluster includes only 7% of 
simulations, but it is a possible outcome. 
Cluster 1 (containing 20 simulations, in green) 
contains simulations that are almost exactly the 
opposite of cluster 2: in this cluster, all actors have 
a lower satisfaction than in the other cases, except 
for actor 4. In these simulations, the state of 
“Control of flow” is high and the state of 
“Funding” and “Expertise” is low. These 
simulations correspond to the success of option 
(O2) over the other options: in this option, actors 
4 and 5 succeed in making their interest prevails 
over the other actors' interests. Clusters 3 and 4 
(respectively, 42 and 31 simulations, in purple and 
pink) are clusters with mostly average values, 
where most actor satisfactions and resource states 
take an intermediate value between those of 
clusters 1 and 2. These clusters gather 75% of the 
simulations and thus correspond to the most 
likely outcome of the negotiation process. Cluster 
3 is characterized by a stable low satisfaction for 
actors 5 and 7 and by a high state for “Self 
funding”. These simulations are rather in favor of 
option (O1). In cluster 4, actors 4 and 5 are more 
satisfied than in the other clusters and the state of 
“Self funding” and “Studies” is low. These 
simulations are rather in favor of option (O2). 
Finally, simulation 16 (in cluster 4) is very unlike 
the others: in this simulation the number of steps 
is low (814 whereas the median number of steps is 
equal to 1,032 and the average number of steps is 
equal to 1,259), indicating a fast convergence and 
thus the likelihood of a good overall satisfaction of 
the actors. Indeed, almost all actors are very 
satisfied in this simulation, except for actors 5, 6 
and 7 but the main fact worth noting is that all 
resources have reached their upper bound values 
in this simulation. We will elaborate on this 
specific simulation in the next section. 
 
 
Figure 4: Hierarchical clustering. Experiments are partitioned into 4 clusters (numbered 
from 1 (at left) to 4 (at right)) as represented by the colored rectangles. An outlier 
(simulation number 16) can also be identified (at the right hand side of the figure). 
Cluster 1 
 
Cluster 2 
 
Figure 5: Boxplots of the number of steps (left), of the resource states (middle) and of the actor satisfactions 
(right), for clusters 1 (top) and 2 (bottom). The boxplot colors have the same meaning than in Figure 1. 
 
Cluster 3 
 
Cluster 4 
 
Figure 6: Boxplots of the number of steps (left), of the resource states (middle) and of the actor satisfactions 
(right), for clusters 3 (top) and 4 (bottom). The boxplot colors have the same meaning than in Figure 1. 
 
 
 Figure 7: Boxplot of the actors' satisfactions by cluster. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 8: Boxplots of the ressources' states by cluster. 
 
4.  Self-organizing map 
Finally, the simulations are clustered using a Self-
Organizing Map (SOM, KOHONEN, 2000) 
algorithm. SOM is an unsupervised learning 
method that maps the data onto a one- or a two-
dimensional grid. The grid is made of several 
neurons in which the simulations are clustered. 
The grid comes up with a topology and the 
clustering is performed so that the topological 
properties of the input space are preserved on the 
grid: hence, two simulations classified in neurons 
close on the grid are more alike than two 
simulations classified in neurons that are distant 
on the grid. Thus, this method provides clustering 
combined with visualization where the whole set 
of simulations can be displayed and the relations 
between the main features of the simulations can 
be understood. The size of the grid, as well as its 
topology, are chosen by the user. A frequent 
heuristic is to choose a grid having dimensions 
/ 10N  and a square or an hexagonal topology. 
In this application a batch version of the SOM 
algorithm is used, as implemented in the R 
package yasomi4.  
 
 
Figure 9 is the “hit map” of the resulting SOM: the 
size of each cluster corresponds to number of 
simulations it gathers. The cluster located at the 
top right corner of the map contains a single 
                                                          
4 Still under development but available at https://r-forge.r-
project.org/projects/yasomi/  
observation, simulation 16, described as an outlier 
in the previous section.  
Figures 10 and 11 display the clusters' profiles, 
regarding the actor satisfactions and the resource 
states, respectively. On the contrary, Figures 12 
and 13 display, with a color scale, the average 
values of the variables by cluster, compared to the 
global range of the variables, to make the 
comparison between clusters easier. 
 
Figure 9. Hitmap: the size of each colored square 
is proportional to the number of simulations 
classified in the corresponding neuron. 
 Figure 10: Actor satisfaction distributions in each cluster of the map. Blue boxplot are those for which the 
median of the corresponding actor's satisfaction is above 50 and red boxplot are those for which the median 
of the corresponding actor's satisfaction is below 50. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Resource state distributions in each cluster of the map. 
Figure 12: Average actor satisfactions by cluster: dark green corresponds to the highest values and dark pink to 
the lowest ones. 
 
Regarding the map, the most typical simulation 
cases are: 
 at the top right hand side of the map, that 
corresponds to simulation 16, most actors 
are not satisfied, except for actors 4, 8, 9 
and 10. There, actor 4 is much more 
satisfied than in the other clusters. 
Moreover, the simulation shows a lower 
satisfaction of upstream villages (low 
values for “Expertise” and “Funding”) and 
a high satisfaction for the riparian farmers 
(higher value for “Lobbying” and “Control 
of flow”). Although all resources are at 
their top level, the outcomes of these 
simulations show some inconsistencies: 
(O1) is not likely (for actor 6, this is the 
worst case), neither (O2) (despite the fact 
that actor 4 is very satisfied, actor 5 is 
not), neither (O3) (this is also the worst 
case scenario for actor 3). This is 
confirmed by the failure of (O4) (for actor 
7, this is the worst case scenario). So this 
cluster corresponds to a case having a very 
low social plausibility because every actor 
is losing; 
 the left hand side of the map is 
characterized by an opposite description: 
most actors are quite satisfied and the 
level of self funding, coming from actor 6, 
is high. These simulations also show a 
high level of funding coming from actor 3. 
Most simulations of cluster 2 of the 
hierarchical clustering are classified on the 
left hand side of the map, and especially 
on the top left corner, which is thus 
representative of option (O4); 
 the center of the map (from the bottom 
left corner to the upper right corner) 
contains simulations that were classified 
in the two other clusters of the 
hierarchical clustering of the previous 
section. In particular, simulations of 
cluster 4 are classified in the bottom left 
corner and those of cluster 3 in the upper 
right hand side of the map (except for the 
neuron containing only one simulation). 
These simulations correspond to 
intermediate outcomes between the two 
main options (O2) and (O4). These 
outcomes are closer to options (O1) and 
(O3). 
The self-organizing map algorithm thus leads to 
conclusions similar to the ones found with the 
hierarchical clustering algorithm. This approach 
provides the user also with a representation of the 
set of simulations as a map and thus gives him an 
intuitive overview on their respective similarities, 
proximities or differences. It details the 
possibilities of each resource and each actor. 
However, from the point of view of the system of 
collective, this level of details can make it more 
difficult to identify the social patterns that emerge 
from the simulations. 
 
4. Conclusion and discussion 
 
In the field of social simulation, most of the 
considered cases are rough simplification of a 
Figure 13: Average resource states by cluster: dark green corresponds to the highest values and dark pink to the 
lowest ones. 
phenomenon which is modeled as a “stylized fact”. 
The purpose of such simulation models is to 
propose a mechanism, as simple as possible, that 
is able to generate the phenomenon as an 
emergence from the interactions between the 
system’s components. In this case, the study of the 
simulation outputs is easy and brings only one 
information: outputs are expected to be steadily 
focused since their dispersion means that the 
proposed mechanism is not a good explanation of 
the cause of the phenomenon. 
On the other hand, the data analysis of simulation 
outputs is a source of valuable knowledge when, 
as it is our case, the simulation refers to a concrete 
system. In this case, the purpose of simulation is 
not just to get a “good fit” between the expected 
results and the model outputs; the distribution of 
simulation outputs is meaningful and it may be 
compared with field data on the system under 
study5. On the contrary, the actual configuration 
which is observed is interpreted as just one of the 
possible functioning of the system. This 
functioning has stabilized the actors’ behavior 
more or less steadily, as the result of past events, 
contingent opportunities or constraints, random 
choices made at bifurcation points, or whatever 
circumstance. A social system exhibits only one of 
its potentialities and most systems could operate 
in another way under other circumstances, to the 
extent of their adaptability. The benefice of the 
statistical analysis of simulation outputs is to 
reveal these other possible functioning. 
 
The analysis of the set of simulations leads to the 
conclusion that two main opposite options are 
likely to happen: on the one hand, upstream 
villages are taking the best over the other actors 
and the daily-life of upstream villages is the main 
factors influencing the final decision (option 
(O2)) or a compromise acceptable for all actors is 
found (option (O4)). In between these two main 
configurations, the simulations tend to favor more 
or less one or the other of the two options. This 
typology is well represented on the map produced 
by the SOM algorithm.  
For the sociologist, his questioning about the 
power relationships within the management of the 
river Touch led to the statement of four 
hypotheses (see (SIBERTIN-BLANC et al. 2013c) 
                                                          
5 Here, we assume the scientific legitimacy of a 
quantitative approach of social affairs and, in the case of 
this paper, the feasibility of faithful SocLab models. We 
do not elaborate on this, see e.g. ROGGERO and 
SIBERTIN-BLANC, 2008, for further discussion. 
for the sociological theories that ground theses 
hypotheses): 
Hypothesis 1: To be the “obligatory passage 
point” of the Actor-Network, is that SIAH has 
enough power to somehow constrain other actors? 
Hypothesis 2: Purposing to play an important 
role and to introduce a change in the management 
of flood risk, is that SIAH has the means to do so? 
Hypothesis 3: In the enrolment of other actors 
on the service of a hydromorphological 
management of the river, is that SIAH has 
powerful allies? 
Hypothesis 4: Is that the agreement on the 
“Territorial Public Interest” is confirmed by the 
absence of major conflict in the system of action? 
The SocLab model presented in this paper has 
been developed to serve as a benchmark for 
testing these hypotheses, and the provided 
answers integrate arguments coming from both 
statistical analysis of simulation output and 
analytical properties of the very model. All in all, 
the SocLab analysis of the case confirms the 
hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, but not the hypothesis 4 
that is a necessary condition for option O4. 
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Appendix: material description 
The dataset is provided as a csv file separated by 
tabulations named runs-soclab.csv; it was 
generated from the SocLab simulation plateform 
 http://soclabproject.wordpress.com. 
The statistical analysis was done using the free 
statistical software environment R and the packages 
ellipse and yasomi were used for that purpose. 
Most results and other additional analyses can be 
made using the scripts available on the web page 
 
http://www.nathalievilla.org/spip.php?articl
e86 
(this page is unfortunately only in French for the 
moment). In particular, the analyses described in 
this paper can be made using the functions CORR(), 
CAH() and SOM(). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
